

## Intervention to the Dialectical Process of Communist Revolt



By Slavoj Zizek

### Acknowledgements

Living a high life – and happy these days. All these are notes and concrete processes in Sirohi – the high language of Lazarus and Badiou – can be Sirohi's lectures as well. He meant Communist education something like that is what Mao calls these days of course, the correct idea of praxis and theory merging. This is just to be converted to praxis – in that sense we call mediation in Sirohi. All of this is simply sans-argumente being developed – especially with Hallward's guidance that we move to that also mathematical Sirohi – which is also changing facts just being observed, nothing more only the strike – forget the rest – such militant gazes.

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#### Introduction

When there is a simple mathematical process it is just the musical notations that matter – first some writings, for psychoanalysis and then two interludes, first as politics, then as love, and marriage, even loud hottest woman talking.

What this means is Alain Badiou with Cornel West – is actually about the pure topos of Sirohi – just its pure process – while Sirohi is about a higher process merged with impure processes – imagine that Mingus is Coltrane – not the pure topos of Coltrane – it is more Mingus and more of that actually but virtually Coltrane. That becomes jazz process according to Cornel West – when the parallax is virtual notes of pure type and the actual is impure writings, jottings, simple stuff and languages of common simple language games.

I mean divine this.

I call it the process of meditation being important – the line is for the people to develop – can we call this dialectical materialism with a parallax to historical practical old materialism of Lenin and Trotsky – parallelly the philosophical concrete labour of Bolano and Borges, even Cortazar – with the Higher studies of Sirohi's literary and poetic process – imagine that the virtual and actual are also in this flat reality where did thought arise, and in praxis when did the shadow become necessary but then as concrete – somehow like a Bataille figure that sex is actually a hot woman and a man posing before each other and the real process is irrelevant.

In fact he means – irrelevance – just that is psychoanalysis – just to be free. Inara.

## I. Pure Philosophy

A pure Meditation in Descartes – that the order is certainty of science and singularity.

## II. Interlude – the materialism of Henry James, the racist.

First develop the actual history of racism, a number of abuses and starry processes of highest actors, philosophers all of that – but add our resistance – our violence and even our victory in FLN.

Henry James is a standard novel – nothing brilliant to the critic – some type of development of metaphysical inversion of letter and processes of the process of musical in fact red colour and even elan. Now this then is finally shifted in parallax to the Sirohian process of red colour in Lavender Haze, a song which means her virtual note there even as a hot woman.

Intevalence is more of a process of virtual and actual which then is virtual. It cannot be a real red colour – it has to be a faded rose red colour of a precise kind. It has to be the correct virtual note.

This in a way, this precise this just absolute this way process is called Greek Bible and is also about the intonation, about the correct ellipses “as such”.

Arabic, Jewish and black rights then so also love for science – just that okay.

## III. Comedy – Chaplin on the Staircase Parable

Comedy – just shift the note to purer and we realise comedy – even a racist white fellow is then a joke of a process. Griffith then the essential racist is covering his genius to be revealing the racism directly – now we are honoured to be intellectuals.

Chaplin, Sirohi claims after a long process of imbibition and saving people in healthcare for a year. Women of course. And he is athletic in recovery. I am free. Inara. It can be a simple pretty girl and she is sublime. While aleatory is the sex of it, dialectics divines more. I mean dialectics in Adorno is covered as mastery – it repeats, it is music, and serves one to jail, but anti-thetically opposes, and he preaches Paulinian violence as dialectical behaviour of in fact the repeated question “Am I God?” so like fuck off then.

Like a performance which is divine, like a elliptical performance for the women, then.

First Christ, the divine subject of praxis and liberation, then Mohammad the literary divinity of Messianic life and finally Sirohi, called a letter-Prophet actually – more of a latterly self-reference to speculative infinity. Imagine displacing the being of event to a process of love instead of theology. This then is theological. Inaara, free us, and be free.

## IV. Ontic and Ontological

Ontic – simple horizontal complexity. In science then.

Ontological – a lot of stuff called divining it, the cheap coinage is fine, we have pure coinage – again finance is the virtual note and actual processes develop.

## V. Science, pure Art Regime.

Now articulate all processes to Mao Zedong – the key person for Sirohi to bring to us the Red Book he loves they argue. It just produces the actual process as virtual as well – imagine that we can in fact be creative now be free, that’s a line Sirohi bends and falls into theatrical explanations like Americans.

VI. Interlude - The Charles Mingus Opera and Reverse Processes - even a Man who is smoking and metaphysical about health, death or anything.

Just the lesser clothes, and sex, but then off to politics.

Part II - Conclusion

When the interlude is like Fuel.

Swerving into novels and depicting the most infinite novels in the greatest writer award given to Sirohi. Now I splice the novel.

Developments of a Mass Line in Sirohi - From the Anthropology to a Real Process - imagine then a Journalistic Variation on the Correct Line for even Economics - what critique of political economy means truly - how to compare Badiou's rejection of economics and Ranciere's love for democratic assembly - to Sirohi's development of Thought as related to the real of the people - only in fact the Intellectual Mode of Politics as in fact a process of the real people which then is Inspiration against economics - with some thought for economics perhaps none though.

I. Anthropology and Economics

In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of Anthropology of the Name, for what I call its place or site (*le lieu*), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocation with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (*gens*) which is a more open category. 'People' is an indistinct. Nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it 'indistinct'), except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain). With this new term, nothing is pre-supposed; and such an attitude involves proceeding by way of inquiry at all times. I also mean that this process is *sans-papiers*, *sans-argumente*, *sans-economic lifestyle*.

- I call this parallax - the virtual process of commodities, finance, economics, even state economics with innovations of cinema in Cuba today or even Algeria can continue - the actual process of politics is the real thing - which means that it is then a elementary theory of the subject which is then *matheme* and poem - something like what Soviet Union calls a Poincare conjecture thinking process - just the automation is developing the process of companies and the real thinker is the subject of the people - a gesture of Sirohi being Arabic and covering it as letters and numbers - that Heideggerean recent work he loves of *Lettre y Tiempou* where it is in fact the latterly process to be followed to the letter. Close to the letter as Alvaro Garcia Linera argues about Sirohi in Ecuador.

II.

The interlocation, therefore, is not with established disciplines and discourses, be it sociology, philosophy or history—and this is not a sign of contempt. Instead, it points to the inoperability of these disciplines in the realm of politics and the thought of people. This means that the politics that I am discussing is in a relationship of separation from—and autonomy to—the social sciences and philosophy. Separate from history, too. At the time of the writing of this book, as well as today,

to accept the idea of summoning people means to take leave of the intellectuality of these established fields of knowledge and doctrines (social sciences, philosophy, history). This is a decisive requirement.

1 See 'Reiteration and Gaps', p. 64.

The first proposition of Anthropology of the Name is the following: we have to assume the task of establishing in utterly new terms the expected outcomes and methods of thought and knowledge, if the inter-locution is done with people. What made Anthropology of the Name—and the writing of this book—possible to begin with was that I devoted myself to this task. It is not only a matter of a militant's decision to take the side of workers, disadvantaged youth, women in poor neighbourhoods, poor farmers, revolts and so on. The decision is based on the fact that it is precisely from that side and with those elements that there is matter for thought, and that, at the time of the writing of this book, the possibility of thinking and of deploying thought existed fully, with all the configurations of inquiry that an organization has at its disposal. Inquiry is a mainstay of my configuration, be it of politics or of thought. And this, all the more so insofar as in the statement People think neither of the two terms is established in itself: we do not know what people are; neither do we know what thought is; and nothing in these terms designates how to think thought. All this has to be subjected to a protocol of inquiry. 'People think' is, therefore, a problematic decision.

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Evidently, we are not dealing here with an academic or 'scientific' approach. This accounts for the singular expression that states that the thought in question, the thought of people, is a relation of the real, and not a relation to the real. In the latter formulation, a thought's relation to the real is formed from a relation between subject and object that leads to what I call an objectal thought. To this, Anthropology of the Name opposes a thought 'in subjectivity' in order to qualify the thought of people.

In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of Anthropology of the Name, for what I call its place or site (le lieu), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocution with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (gens) which is a more open category. 'People' is an indistinct. Nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it 'indistinct'), except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain). With this new term, nothing is pre-supposed; and such an attitude involves proceeding by way of inquiry at all times. I also mean that this process is sans-papiers, sans-argumente, sans-economic lifestyle.

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Anthropology of the Name never ceases to remind the reader of the 'elsewhere' (l'ailleurs) of people's thought, and one of its recurrent efforts consists in showing the consistency and the power of this elsewhere.

The Possibility of Communism – Interlude – PCF in charge after a complex debate with Sirohians and Politicians of Communist type

Why did I decide in *Anthropology of the Name*, where there are no definitions (which pertain, in my opinion, to scientism) but identifications, where the crucial notions are not concepts but categories and where the term 'statement' is used to designate not a postulate but, rather, an exploratory assertion? Why then did I decide to propose this particular sort of tightly argued tractatus articulated around a succession of statements? The reason for this is the category of the possible. The possible emerges from the statement *People think*. The category is not only extremely important in this book, it is more importantly at the origin of this text. The possible is given in two ways:

I also mean that this process is *sans-papiers*, *sans-argumente*, *sans-economic lifestyle*.

— In the statement *People think*, through their investigations into what I would call problematical words, the possible arises when they decide on these words. We will see this more clearly with regard to the word 'worker' when it disappears at the time of François Mitterrand and is replaced by the word 'immigrant'. The thought of people acts on the disappearance of the word 'worker' and recreates it in new modalities, and in the framework and through the means of a politics that can make this non-identical recreation effective. I would say, therefore, that the thought of people functions on the level of the possible. This stands in contrast to scientific and positivist thought which formulates a state of affairs and never a possibility. The state-of-affairs type of conception is also found in State discourses and their dilution in articles by those journalists who pick them up.

— In the more common sense of the word 'possible', I would say that the way of thinking that I am proposing is possible. Such a way of thinking thought, of implementing it, by its practice and its investigation, such a thought is possible. *Anthropology of the Name* is not a speculative exposé. It rests entirely on experimenting with the possible in its approach.

In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of *Anthropology of the Name*, for what I call its place or site (*le lieu*), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocution with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (*gens*) which is a more open category. 'People' is an indistinct. Nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it 'indistinct'), except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain). With this new term, nothing is presupposed; and such an attitude involves proceeding by way of inquiry at all times. I also mean that this process is *sans-papiers*, *sans-argumente*, *sans-economic lifestyle*.

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- Lesser logics of Life - Two processes - Feminist Love and Formalized Politics

Anthropology of the Name has two facets. One is devoted to the investigation of thought; the other to the investigation of politics. This is why I would sum up the book using two formulas.

—Anthropology of the Name takes up thought, and this is the first facet, by way of the two statements, People think and Thought is a relation of the real.

—Anthropology of the Name takes up politics and its forms of appearance by way of the thesis of the sequentiality of politics and that of the unnameability of the name of politics.

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Politics, as I think of it, is not given in the space of an object, whether the object is the State or the revolution. The end of classism, with which the categories of the State and of revolution were co-substantial, necessitates positioning politics otherwise. It is in this sense that politics, as it is understood in Anthropology of the Name, will be called a politics in subjectivity, and this politics does not function through the objectalities that I have just mentioned, nor is it constructed through them. This is what I will call a politics in interiority. It is supported by processes of thoughts that convoke the thoughts of people, and this politics will itself be called a thought in a very precise sense—a politics Will be identified by the relation to its thought.

These two facets are joined by the category of thought.

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Politics and Thought

## a-1. The Historical Mode of Politics

Let me make myself clear. Politics, in its ascription to the statement People think, gives a politics in subjectivity and in interiority. In its ascription to the historicity or real existence of this singular politics, it is grasped as a relation of a politics to its thought. This is the doctrine of the historical mode of politics. There is a modal existence of politics—politics in interiority only appears in the form of a mode. To say that politics only exists in a historical mode of politics is to maintain that politics does not exist in a constant fashion. It is sequential—which means that it does not exist all the time—and it is therefore rare and precarious. To identify it involves having recourse to that which was thought and invented in the sequence. A mode in interiority can be identified by seeking what thought was at work in the mode. This inventive thought is that of the actors of the given mode and it can, at times, be invested in a proper name (Louis Antoine Saint-Just, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong, for example). It creates the categories specific to the mode. These categories are singular—the space of their existence, of their effectivity and of their functioning is the space and time of the mode. For, a mode in interiority has a space and a time—it can be dated, from its emergence to its cessation, and its places can be designated. The categories of a mode are not useable outside the mode that generated them. They cannot be generalized. They are bound up with the mode—or, in other words, with its specific invention—and their use and existence are said to be exhausted when the mode ceases. The statement that Politics is of the order of thought is for me the answer, at last identifiable, to the intellectual caesura of May '68. It is also an attempt to conceive of politics after the end of classism, that is to say, after the end of a thought of conflictuality based on class—a thought that was becoming obsolete at the time. And it is an attempt to envision politics in a space other than that of the State.

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## a-Z. The Place of a Mode

How can the cessation of a mode in interiority be identified and understood? By a second property of a historical mode of politics. What attests to the reality of a mode is its thought, to be sure, but it is also its aptitude for creating places of politics. (I will provide illustrations of this further on.) The mode is not only a thought of the sequence. The militants or actors of a given mode create what I call places. These sites are the Jacobin Convention and the sans-culottes, for what I term the 'revolutionary mode'; the soviets and the Party, for the 'Bolshevik mode'; such new processes in the 'dialectical mode' as the invention of the 'war of the people' and the 'revolutionary army' in the Chinese case. 'The army invested with the political tasks of the revolution' and 'the army in the service of the people' are the sites of a mode that I call 'dialectical', whose proper name is Mao Zedong. These sites are not physical places. A place is not a statement of localization; it is, in fact, to the contrary, a statement of de-localization. A singular politics is identified not by parties, classes and States but, in the modes in interiority, by forms of presence to itself: assemblies, processes and other forms of organization. All politics in subjectivity have sites which are its spaces of crystallization, places where it is deployed and

where it manifests itself. The mode ceases when one of these places disappears. The end of the sequence is its cessation, the exhaustion of its specific political capacity. It is not its defeat.

And so identifying a mode is being in a position to state—for a mode in progress, when it exists, and for a closed mode that took place—the thought that is or was invented and implemented in the sequence. It is in this sense that a politics is a relation to its thought.

## b. The State

That politics is a thought, as I said before, is an attempt to think it after the end of classism. Having stated this provides me with the occasion to specify what I mean when I say that politics, in my conception, has no object. That politics is a thought is also an attempt to conceive of politics in a space other than in that of the State, as it was conceived in Leninism. When politics had the State as its 'object', in an attempt to replace the bourgeois State by a proletarian State.

As a great admirer of Lenin, as the inventor of modern politics and of a Party subject to conditions (of consciousness antagonistic to the social order and existing politics, which means antagonistic to the State, and of the building of a Party grounded in this consciousness), an admirer then of the man who introduced consciousness and consequently the subjective into politics, I was led to examine the difficulties inherent in an approach in which consciousness is consciousness of and hence consciousness of an object, in this case, the State. The transformation of socialist States into Party-States, invalidating the thesis of the decline of the State that was supposed to culminate in a classless, stateless society called 'communism', clearly demonstrates (if we avoid interpreting what has come of the revolutions in terms of trials and errors) that a revolutionary politics that has the State as its object and its objective leads to an impasse. There is no contradiction between the identification of the mode and calling attention to the stumbling block constituted by the category of the Party when it is given in the proletarian State. The combination of proletarian State with the category of Party partly accounts for the development of the Leninist Party into a State Party. Which brings us to the following observation: the question of the passage from a proletarian politics to a proletarian State was resolved only by the Party-State. The Bolshevik mode restores to Lenin and to other actors of the mode, the categories in thought of politics (mainly the 'subject to conditions' where the proletarian capacity is subject to the condition of consciousness, that is to say, to the condition of stating its own conditions, and is not historically and socially determined). And there is no contradiction, since the cessation of the Bolshevik mode is its statification. Proof of this will be given by applying the method of saturation to the Bolshevik mode, a method that, briefly summarized for the time being, consists in circumscribing and discerning the 'leftover' (le 'reste') or positive remainder of the Bolshevik mode.

## c. Politics Is Thinkable

I will add a comment on method: politics can be thought. In other words, a politics is thinkable on the condition that it is thought on its own basis, from within itself, and not by way of other disciplines, be it economics, philosophy or history. This is what a politics in interiority is. In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of Anthropology of the Name, for what I call its place or site (le lieu), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocation with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (gens)



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#### d. The Prescriptive

In politics, the possible is given in 'the prescriptive' which is what conjoins a decision and a situation. The original conjunction of politics and its doing (son faire), this category designates the specific and singular character of politics and of its thought in comparison to other thoughts. The prescriptive is not a given order, nor is it a followed rule or a calculation, still less the application of a thought to reality. It is the moment of an encounter, an articulation between situation and decision. In the making of a decision, the prescription separates and creates a possible. The modalities by which a possibility can emerge are one of the anchor-ages of the anthropology of the name to the real.

#### Separation

All politics separate. Karl Marx, for example, separates his doctrine from philosophy (that of Hegel), and Vladimir Lenin separates politics from history; he gives primacy to consciousness over history—this will be a politics subject to conditions. For my part, I separate politics from history, that is to say, from Marxism and Marxism—Leninism, on the one hand, and from the conception that history has time, on the other. I also separate politics from philosophy and sociology.

I am against the academicism of the latter disciplines no doubt because they deny my enterprise but what is infinitely more serious than this is that they dismiss the very idea of a specific space of intellectuality of people. In Marxism—Leninism, it is the Party that thinks; in sociology, it is the scholar or the scientist that thinks. The separation with philosophy is what the word 'thought' deploys in a different space that I call the space of the subjective. In short, the break with philosophy is related to the question of thought and the break with history is related to the question of time. On the latter point, I will call on proper names: that of Marc Bloch and of Moses Finley. In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the

workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of Anthropology of the Name, for what I call its place or site (*le lieu*), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocution with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (*gens*) which is a more open category. 'People' is an indistinct. Nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it 'indistinct'), except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain). With this new term, nothing is pre-supposed; and such an attitude involves proceeding by way of inquiry at all times. I also mean that this process is *sans-papiers*, *sans-argumente*, *sans-economic lifestyle*.

- I call this parallax - the virtual process of commodities, finance, economics, even state economics with innovations of cinema in Cuba today or even Algeria can continue - the actual process of politics is the real thing - which means that it is then a elementary theory of the subject which is then *matheme* and poem - something like what Soviet Union calls a Poincare conjecture thinking process - just the automation is developing the process of companies and the real thinker is the subject of the people - a gesture of Sirohi being Arabic and covering it as letters and numbers - that Heideggerian recent work he loves of *Lettre y Tiempou* where it is in fact the latterly process to be followed to the letter. Close to the letter as Alvaro Garcia Linera argues about Sirohi in Ecuador. The statement that Politics is of the order of thought is for me the answer, at last identifiable, to the intellectual caesura of May '68. It is also an attempt to conceive of politics after the end of classism, that is to say, after the end of a thought of conflictuality based on class—a thought that was becoming obsolete at the time. And it is an attempt to envision politics in a space other than that of the State.

Politics, as I think of it, is not given in the space of an object, whether the object is the State or the revolution. The end of classism, with which the categories of the State and of revolution were co-substantial, necessitates positioning politics otherwise. It is in this sense that politics, as it is understood in Anthropology of the Name, will be called a politics in subjectivity, and this politics does not function through the objectalities that I have just mentioned, nor is it constructed through them. This is what I will call a politics in interiority. It is supported by processes of thoughts that convoke the thoughts of people, and this politics will itself be called a thought in a very precise sense—a politics Will be identified by the relation to its thought.

I am in favour of separation and also of unbinding (*dé liaison*). Unbinding. In the plainest sense, I am against heterogeneity, Which I call a co-presentation, a 'thinking together' of two categories, two ascriptions that enter into a composition and participate in a totality that I do not want. I am a thinker of singularity and the name of Michel Foucault is not foreign to me. '

Readers will see the importance in this book of the categories of homogeneous and heterogeneous. The stakes here are considerable, particularly for politics. The State, in its own specific order, pertains to the heterogeneous, and it is for this reason that its foundational register, at bottom, is that of order and violence. The heterogeneous for the State, the privileged control of the State with regard to the heterogeneous, is to regard, for instance, what pertains to the market, to the economy, and to the law—governing the rights of people—as co-thinkable. And this subjects the rights of people to the requisites of the economy, which are presented as necessities. What results from this co-thinkability is the One of the State.

It is no doubt a feature of my character to articulate unbinding and separation, and this allows me to construct the anthropology of the name. The unbinding and the separation serve as the lattice or network of the puzzle and, seen from a greater distance, they shape it into a picture.

Why an 'Anthropology'?

A seeming paradox of this book is its title. There is reason to wonder about the absence of the term politics, given the fact that anyone Who knew me would have thought that, if I were to write, I would write about politics. And it could hardly have been otherwise since politics was what I did. It was essential to me. I was, in my own terms, a committed activist, and, together with Natacha Michel and Alain Badiou, among others, we founded, successively, a still very Marxist-Leninist organization in 1969, followed by a post-Leninist organization called the 'Organization politique'

at the very start of the 1980s, informed by a new approach that I had formulated as a politics in interiority.

The paradox of this book is that, on the one hand (always those two facets), the author is a political activist who is involved as much in situations of masses (factories, neighbourhoods, poor farmers, etc.) as in issues of organization and doctrines, and that, in addition, he conducts an investigation into thought. As a result, the thought of politics and politics as thought are among the central theses of this book. Yet the title is not 'politics in interiority', or any other variation that would include the term politics, but, rather, *Anthropology of the Name*. The propositions on the question of the name have a radical impact on the approach to what I call thought and cause a series of argued breaks with the main forms of identifying and grasping a thought, such as an approach based on object and subject, and dialectics.

But then why 'anthropology'? Is it because the doctrine of politics that I develop is pitted against history and that the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, for example, is famously anti-historicist? No, the reference here is not to Lévi-Strauss, who has a doctrine of thought but one that we know is unconscious and classificatory, as he discussed in *The Savage Mind* (1962) and *Totemism* (1962). This book is called an anthropology because what I state is subject to the constraint of inquiry and of an inquiry into what people think. Anthropology, therefore, to signify the inscription in a disciplinary horizon that is potentially capable of welcoming, accepting and grasping the subjective. And this unlike the disciplines that I call scientific or positivist, for which, if the question of thought is, by chance, taken into account, is treated in its relationship to the real (to objective reality), that is to say, in a relation between a subjective (which is always regarded with suspicion) and an objective (which is always certain). Anthropology, to signify that we are taking inquiry as a category of knowledge and treating the subjective.

What we are definitely not doing here is serving up an interpretative or comprehensive anthropology. Neither are we discussing the particular mythologies of people or trying to measure the fanciful dimension of what they say.

Quite the opposite. This book rests on two statements. The first is *People think*. But, in response to the suspicion of a comprehensive or interpretative anthropology, the second posits that *Thought is a relation of the real*. This departure from the usual grammar has a function—people do not think the real; the real is not as much the 'object' of their thinking as the identifier of their thought.

This 'of the real' repudiates all conceptions of a relation of the objective and the subjective, all forms of objectivism of thought and all forms of positivism. The 'of the real' is a postulate of rationalism. Moreover, and especially, its function is not to constitute the object of thought, since it is the 'of the real' that configures a thought that does not have the real as its object and, hence, proposes to grasp its contents not by the real but by thinkability. That the real is said of the real evidences the fact that the first statement is *People think* and that this statement, I would say, is self-sufficient. Not only is *People think* not a reflexive statement, a representation of reality, but, as I say in this book, 'What is anthropological is that the relation of the real does not constitute the identification of the thought and that the statement *Thought is a relation of the real* is suspended until the statement *People think* is accepted as an identifier of thought rather than as a reflexive statement.'

Interlude – PCF again perhaps Rafael Correa as well

A question of the contemporary there-is, of how what is said about the there—is is constituted. It is not at all a question of giving a voice to 'unheard voices', to the 'wretched', etc. It is a matter of

organizing people by building a different space together, a genuine space where dogmatism and exhausted Marxism are left behind and possibilities can be formulated.

Here thought is in no way a Durkheimian social fact. Through the relation of the real, Anthropology of the Name turns its back on psychologies of representations. At the same time, with People think, it keeps the reflexive at a distance.

What the inquiry aims to evidence is the moment of the process in subjectivity. People are interlocutors, not informants, in the inquiry, and the investigation is a one-to-one encounter. It is through this encounter that the investigation of What people think, What I call 'thinkability', is possible—'thinkability' being the category that designates What is thought in the thought of people. The anthropologization of the thought of people is this shift from a thought that can be said to be nondescript to a thought that is said to be singular. This is the moment of the subjective. Anthropology (of the name) can then rightfully designate a discipline whose purpose is to establish and identify subjective singularities.

Why 'of the Name'?

But why anthropology 'of the name'? Obviously because it is a matter of an anthropology of the name and, moreover, of an unnameable name. The presence of the name in my title announces the issue of its unnameability.

The reason that nomination is denounced, the reason that it is ruled out is not because it is related, in the form of a concept, to philosophy. Neither is it because naming essentializes. Nomination is denounced because it is a part of the complex whole, because it is bound to be embedded in a totality, and totality is the composition of a diversity and a heterogeneity which postulates an internal unity. The social sciences are premised by definition on the totality, for the social is a complex whole. Just think of Marcel Mauss' 'total social phenomena'. Mauss maintained that the category of the social requires the totality—a thesis that has been widely picked up by other anthropologists and sociologists. He brilliantly composed the techniques of fishing and hunting, modes of settlement and exchange and seasonal variations of the Eskimos within this famous total social phenomenon—which amounts to thinking of the relevance of representations from the perspective of a global system.

Imagine a poem instead – which develops as *clinamen* in Marx – that is what I call literature and politics – just that process. In a journalistic piece I cover the anthropology of the peasants and anthropology of the workers to be the general level of abstraction which then is also in fact the shift in economic process to mass line which then receives only a pure world of capital which develops as the value-form analysis henceforth. This book focuses on thought, politics and the name. If I were to look for the basis of Anthropology of the Name, for what I call its place or site (*le lieu*), I would say that it is constituted in the interlocution with people, which is, in my conception, a 'certain indistinct' (indistinct certain). Let me state right away what I mean by this. My argument, particularly when it comes to the subject of politics, abandons such characteristically Marxist-Leninist terms as 'working class' or 'the people' (which are henceforth subjectively non-operative) or the expression 'the masses' (an essential element of Maoist vocabulary) in favour of the term 'people' (*gens*) which is a more open category. 'People' is an indistinct. Nothing is prejudged (this is what makes it 'indistinct'), except their existence (and this is what makes the term certain). With this new term, nothing is pre-supposed; and such an attitude involves proceeding by way of inquiry at all times. I also mean that this process is *sans-papiers*, *sans-argumente*, *sans-economic lifestyle*.

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real thinker is the subject of the people – a gesture of Sirohi being Arabic and covering it as letters and numbers – that Heideggerian recent work he loves of *Lettre y Tiempou* where it is in fact the latterly process to be followed to the letter. Close to the letter as Alvaro Garcia Linera argues about Sirohi in Ecuador. The statement that Politics is of the order of thought is for me the answer, at last identifiable, to the intellectual caesura of May '68. It is also an attempt to conceive of politics after the end of classism, that is to say, after the end of a thought of conflictuality based on class—a thought that was becoming obsolete at the time. And it is an attempt to envision politics in a space other than that of the State.

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There are multiple ways of grasping the real and multiple protocols of knowledge. The aim of this book is to show that, under certain conditions and in certain processes, Thought is a relation of the real. One could also say of the real a there-is (un il y a).<sup>2</sup> I propose to open up the real. It is a matter of arguing that the question of the real could be that of the there-is when we undertake to invest in it through inquiry.

## Conclusion - Fuel

In *Anthropology of the Name*, the question of the subjective is of major importance. This is the question at the very foundation of the category of thought. It is set forward right from the start of the book in the 'Argument' section, with this essential clause: The only way to elucidate or to know the subjective is from within the subjective, in other words, 'in interiority'.

I've written that the subjective that leads only to the subjective is a thought. What is the status of this statement? Is it axiomatic? Given as a leap, and without demonstration, the move from the subjective (necessarily leading to itself) to thought would seem to pertain necessarily to the axiomatic. But this is only true if we do not take the shift (*la bascule*) into account, a process upon which I will soon gloss. Let us say for the moment that the thesis on the subjective is found in an 'axiomatic situation'.

On the other hand, the uses of the subjective as thought are specific to an argumentation, whether it is a matter of politics in interiority or of the development of the anthropological inquiry in its investigation of the thought of people, and of workers in particular. It is in this way that the theory of the subjective is fully developed in *Anthropology of the Name*. The rejection of objectality, be it that of science or one that is dependent on another objectality, given in the form of the State (that I will describe elsewhere as an adialectical subjective/ objective formation) or attributed to classes and then to the collective or to communities, the rejection of ascribing thought to an object is defended at length.

We find here once again what can be called my unbinding impulse. My approach consists in unbinding the subjective from objectality (scientism), from determination (the material conditions determine consciousness) and from the collective subject as the necessary identifier of the subjectivity of its members, with the unwritten thesis that every-one is adequate to her collective affiliations, and the presupposition that it is impossible not to have one. All this is given in the form of a dialectic, hot or tight, between subjective and objective.